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█ Abstract In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at 
the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as fall-
ing along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the 
sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the 
relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to defend one’s own self-describability 
and, indissolubly, the solidity of one’s own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the 
other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize 
and intersubjectively “domesticate” our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there.  
KEYWORDS: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological 
Insecurity 
 
 
█ Riassunto Meccanismi di difesa: dall’individuale al collettivo – L’articolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa 
dell’identità soggettiva come tema all’intersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i 
meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello colletti-
vo. La mente individuale è la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno 
di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivi-
bilità e, inscindibilmente, la solidità del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, 
le strutture autoprotettive dell’individuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e “addome-
sticano” intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettività e il nostro sentirci esistere.  
PAROLE CHIAVE: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; Identità narrativa; Insi-
curezza ontologica 
 

IN THIS ARTICLE WE ADDRESS the construc-
tion and defense of subjective identity as a 
topic at the intersection of psychology and 
anthropology.1 Ernesto De Martino’s phe-
nomenological psychology of identity will be 
our compass. Following De Martino, we con-
tend that an understanding of identity in its 
individual and collective aspects requires a 
full appreciation of the precarious nature of 
the subject’s self-constructed identity and its 
resulting defensive character. In this perspec-
tive, consciousness of self involves ongoing 
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construction of a system of defences that offer 
a continuously renovated capacity to cope 
with the risk of losing one’s own subjective 
identity. All these defensive mechanisms – it is 
argued – fall along a spectrum that stretches 
from the individual to the collective level. The 
individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsy-
chic defenses and interpersonal maneuvers to 
which each of us appeals, in our relationships 
with other people and our own environment, 
to defend our self-describability and, inextri-
cably, the solidity of our self-conscious being. 
At a social and collective level, on the other 
hand, individual self-protective structures are 
supported by cultural interventions that or-
ganize and intersubjectively “domesticate” our 
subjectivity and our feeling of being-there. 
 
█  1 The threat of ego dissolution 
 
In a memorable passage – brought to our 
attention by Remo Bodei2 – Locke depicts 
the maintenance of personal identity as work:  
 
[…] the ideas, as well as children, of our 
youth, often die before us: and our minds 
represent to us those tombs to which we 
are approaching; where, though the brass 
and marble remain, yet the inscriptions 
are effaced by time, and the imagery 
moulders away. The pictures drawn in 
our minds are laid in fading colours; and 
if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and 
disappear.3  
 
Personal identity consists in this work of 
ceaseless refreshing ideas to guarantee self-
continuity. One is constantly engaged in an 
effort to build bridges across discontinuities, 
the gaps of oblivion and the uncertainties of 
anticipation. If this effort fails, ideas in the 
mind quickly fade, and often vanish from un-
derstanding, leaving behind no footsteps or 
traces, like shadows flying over fields of corn; 
the mind is void of these ideas as if they had 
never arisen in the first place.4 This dramati-
cally reveals the intrinsic fragility of individu-
als, with their constant exposure to ever-
present threats of self-disruption and oblivion. 
Three centuries later, and after endless 
debates on personal identity, Locke’s inquie-
tude about the precarious nature of the sub-
ject’s identity self-construction is fully articu-
lated in Ernesto De Martino’s concept of 
“presence”. In his ethnohistorical study, Il 
mondo magico, De Martino characterizes 
presence as “the person’s unitary being” or, in 
Kantian terms, “the transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness”.5 There is, however, a 
fundamental difference between De Martino 
and Kant: the unity in question is not in itself 
guaranteed insofar as it is not an ahistorical 
datum, but is, rather, a precarious acquisi-
tion, continuously constructed by culture and 
constantly exposed to the risk of crisis, the 
crisis of presence. 
To introduce the issue of the crisis of pres-
ence, De Martino examines a large body of ev-
idence that attests to the widespread presence 
of an altered state of consciousness (called 
“latah” by the Malays, “olon” by the Tungus, 
“irkunii” by the Yukagires, “amurak” by the 
Yakuts, “menkeiti” by the Koriaks, and “imu” 
by the Ainus). This altered state consists in an 
access of echopraxia and echolalia resulting in 
an “ego dissolution” experience, i.e., a blurring 
of the boundaries between self-representation 
and object-representation that precludes the 
synthesis of self-representations into a coher-
ent whole.6  
De Martino frames this negative moment 
within a dialectical perspective. He follows 
Kant in arguing that the act of the transcen-
dental synthetic function grounds the distinc-
tion between the subjective unity of the I and 
the objective unity of the real – and thus the 
autonomy of the person. But, whereas Kant 
assumes the person’s presence as «a uniform 
historical given», De Martino argues that 
«there does not exist any presence, any empir-
ical “being there”, that might be a datum, an 
original immediacy beyond all risk and inca-
pable within its own sphere of any sort of 
drama and of any development – that is, of a 
history».7 As a result, the principle of the 
transcendental unity of self-consciousness is 
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seen as including within itself its opposite in 
the form of the risk of the disintegration of 
the person’s unitary being:  
 
[…] even the supreme principle of the tran-
scendental unity of self-consciousness in-
volves a supreme risk to the person, i.e., 
the risk of losing the supreme principle 
that constitutes and grounds it. This risk 
arises when the person, instead of retaining 
her autonomy in her relationship to the 
contents, abdicates the task, and allows the 
contents to assert themselves, outside the 
synthesis, as undominated elements, as 
given facts in an absolute sense.8  
 
In other words, Kant does not consider 
the process of formation of the person or the 
risks related to this self-making. As a conse-
quence, the Kantian person is always given in 
its unity, as if the psychological level of anal-
ysis was always and in all cases guaranteed by 
the transcendental level of analysis. De Mar-
tino, in contrast, thinks that there is no such 
guarantee, i.e., that empirical being-there, far 
from always being given to itself, is exposed 
to the risk of not being-there and that, con-
sequently, the loss of the original synthetic 
unity of apperception is a real existential risk. 
This is precisely what the ethnological and 
psychopathological literature shows: empirical 
being-there is not given and guaranteed by its 
own being but is rather characterized by a 
structural lability which causes it to struggle 
for its own individual unity and autonomy. As 
a result, the self-conscious subject constitutes 
itself as a repertoire of activities that take 
pains to cope with its lack of ontological guar-
antee, constructing itself on the edge of its 
original “non-being”, as it were. 
In this perspective, one of De Martino’s 
most important achievements lies in his an-
ticipating the current centrality of the topic 
of identity in infant research, in social, per-
sonality and dynamic psychology, and in psy-
chopathology.9 To the extent that this inter-
pretation of De Martino’s work sits well with 
contemporary naturalist sensibilities, it may 
be objected that it maps him onto debates 
and problems within contemporary psycho-
logical sciences and North American philos-
ophy of psychology. As Giovanni Jervis not-
ed,10 however, De Martino’s thought is char-
acterized by a certain tension. On one hand, 
he was a historicist and committed to a 
strongly humanist school of thought like the 
Crocean one, in which he had been trained 
and which in the 1950s he tried to integrate 
with Marxism; this committed him to a cul-
turalist denial of universal psychological 
structures. On the other hand, however, he 
took an ontological and phenomenological 
perspective that led him to seek  for invariant 
psychological structures that enable individ-
uals to defend themselves from anguish; this 
appears most clearly in his interest in psy-
chopathology and structuralist anthropology. 
In brief, especially in the last years of his life, 
De Martino wavered between seeing human 
beings as integrally determined by their his-
tory and thinking instead that, to some ex-
tent, the history of human beings depends on 
the species’ universal mechanisms. And Jervis 
even surmises that  
 
[…] if de Martino had lived in the 1970s 
and 1980s, he would have realized that 
just during those years a new revision was 
in progress, which went in the direction 
lato sensu of structuralism, i.e., a revival 
of Darwinian studies, and hence of the 
importance of the universal structures of 
the mind as a trait of human species.11  
 
With this in mind, De Martino’s tension is 
resolved below by offering a synthesis of the 
socio-cultural and bio-psychological aspects 
of identity self-construction.  
 
█  2 A neo-Jamesian theory of narrative iden-
tity 
 
If we turn our attention to current psycho-
logical sciences, we immediately realize that to-
day, more than a century after William James’s 
groundbreaking chapter, The consciousness of 
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self,12 «one cannot make much progress 
through most areas of human psychology 
without encountering constructs that invoke 
the self».13 In the past 60 years, hundreds of 
thousands of scholarly articles and chapters 
have been published about the self; in this arti-
cle, we focus on three factors that contribute to 
explaining why the topic of identity has played 
such a pivotal role in psychology.  
The first factor concerns general psychol-
ogy and consists in the inextricable link be-
tween identity self-description and self-
consciousness. The second pertains to dy-
namic psychology and developmental psy-
chology and consists in the fact that the con-
struction of affectional life, during infancy 
and across the lifespan, is closely linked to 
the construction of an identity that is well-
defined and accepted as valid. The third con-
cerns social psychology and consists in the 
fact that each of us constantly negotiates the 
validity of our identity in exchanges with 
other people.14 
The interweaving of identity and self-
consciousness lies at the heart of Dan McAd-
ams’ neo-Jamesian theory of narrative identi-
ty. The author begins by opposing his inter-
pretation of James’ theory of the self to 
postmodernist theorizing on identity. Ac-
cording to Gergen, for example, the post-
modern identity is multiple, shattered, bereft 
of any reality except for what is socially con-
structed from moment to moment in every-
day interactions.15 And in his view, this is all 
to the good: the multiplicity of the self 
(which he describes as the “multiphrenic 
condition”) should be accentuated in order 
to allow the subject to expand in different di-
rections, to evolve, and to create ever new 
opportunities for personal growth. McAdams 
takes issue with Gergen: the latter misses a 
fundamental aspect of selfhood, namely, the 
process of synthesizing the disparate ele-
ments that constitute postmodern identity. 
This unifying activity corresponds to James’ 
concept of the self as the subject or I.16 
In this perspective, the I is not a thing, not 
even a part, a component, or an aspect of the 
self: «[it] is really more like a verb; it might be 
called “selfing” or “I-ing”, the fundamental pro-
cess of making a self out of experience».17 The 
“Me” is instead «the primary product of the 
selfing process»; it is «the self that selfing 
makes».18 The Me consists in three forms of 
reflexive experientiality – the material, social 
and spiritual selves – which originate from the 
selfing process. It is «the making of the Me 
that constitutes what the I fundamentally is».19 
So construed, James’ I/Me distinction 
provides a definition of self-consciousness in 
terms of identity. It is thus very much in line 
with De Martino’s criticism of those philo-
sophical views that take self-consciousness as 
a primum. I cannot know that I am without 
knowing who I am: I know that “I exist” in-
sofar as I know that “I exist in a certain way”, 
i.e., with particular features, as a describable 
identity. There is no consciousness of self 
without some description of self, and hence 
without some description of identity. 
James’ consciousness of self is thus a self-
describing, an identity forming, which is a 
unifying, integrative, synthesizing process.20 
Thus McAdams reads James as anticipating a 
number of theories in developmental and 
personality psychology that have made ap-
peal to a general organismic process for inte-
grating subjective experience – e.g., Werner’s 
orthogenetic principle, Piaget’s organization, 
and Jung’s individuation.21 While these vari-
ous concepts differ from each other in im-
portant ways, they converge on the idea that 
human experience tends toward a fundamen-
tal sense of unity in that human beings ap-
prehend experience through an integrative 
selfing process. 
In McAdams’ life-story model of identity, 
James’ I/Me distinction is combined with 
Erik Erikson’s theory of psychosocial devel-
opment and Henry Murray’s research pro-
gram on the Study of Lives. Narrative identi-
ty is here defined as the «broad narrative of 
the Me that the I[-ing] composes, edits, and 
continues to work on».22 This internalized 
and evolving story of the self integrates the 
reconstructed past and the imagined future 
Defense mechanisms: From the individual to the collective level 
 
99 
to provide life with some degree of unity, 
purpose and meaning. That is, people make 
sense of their own lives through narrative 
structures (such as characters, roles, scenes, 
scripts, and plots) which make the Me into 
«an internalized drama».23 
 
█  3 Hermeneutic vs. naturalistic approaches 
to narrative identity 
 
McAdams’ claim that the type of continu-
ity that connects psychological states across 
time in an identity-constituting way is specif-
ically narrative in character is typically asso-
ciated with concerns about practical identity, 
which is personal identity considered in its 
connection to ethical concerns, as in the case 
of Locke’s theory of personhood. The claim 
is that we constitute ourselves as “Lockean 
persons” (i.e., as morally responsible agents) 
by forming and using autobiographical nar-
ratives. The unity of a person is the unity of 
an autobiographical narrative.24 
In some cases, narrative accounts of per-
sonal identity are characterized in opposition 
to the project to amend Locke’s relational 
memory criterion that can be found in psycho-
logical continuity theorists such as David Lew-
is, Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, and John 
Perry. Here the question is a metaphysical 
identity question: on what basis should we 
reidentify a person as numerically the same 
despite qualitative differences over time or 
under different descriptions? Answering such 
a “reidentification” question calls for a criteri-
on of diachronic numerical identity, a criteri-
on of what makes something one and the 
same thing as itself at different times. Howev-
er, when the focus shifts from solely meta-
physical puzzles about the persistence of com-
plex objects to the relation between identity 
and practical and evaluative concerns, the 
question becomes one of “characterization”: 
what characteristics (character traits, motiva-
tions, values, mental and bodily capacities and 
dispositions, emotional attachments, commit-
ments, memories, and so on) make a person the 
particular person that she is? Such a question 
concerns identity in the sense of the Eriksonian 
“identity crisis”; it is a psycho/social/ethical 
identity question.25 
According to some proponents of the narra-
tive view, however, the psycho/social/ethical 
identity question is importantly related to the 
metaphysical identity question. In fact, they 
first build those activities of self-interpretation 
and self-creation that are central to our experi-
ence of being persons into the kind of continui-
ty that connects person A and person B across 
time in an identity-constituting way.26 Then, 
they identify what enables persons to be active-
ly self-interpreting and self-creating agents with 
the construction of self-narratives. In short, 
«the metaphysical “glue” that binds person 
stages together into persons is narrative con-
nectedness, not “mere” psychological connect-
edness».27 
The narrative account, however, comes in 
different forms. Authors such as Jerome 
Bruner, Alasdair Macintyre, and Charles 
Taylor view the person as a self-interpreting 
being in a sense inspired by the hermeneuti-
cal tradition, namely a tradition that is large-
ly foreign – or even hostile – to naturalistic 
commitments.28 An empirically-informed 
narrativist account of personal identity re-
quires a view of self-interpretation as an ac-
tivity of narrative reappropriation of the 
products of the unconscious processing – an 
activity implemented by apparatuses such as 
Dennett’s “Joycean machine”, or Gazzaniga’s 
“interpreter module”, or Carruthers’ “min-
dreading system”.29 In this perspective, per-
sons are self-interpreting beings in a sense 
that is congenial to a view of personal identi-
ty in terms of psychological continuity, but 
fundamentally foreign to the hermeneutical 
tradition. As Jervis notes, a hermeneutical 
notion of self-interpretation, insofar as it 
puts exclusive emphasis upon meaning (i.e., 
the intentional directing of consciousness) at 
the expense of the psychobiological theme of 
the unconscious, surreptitiously reintroduces 
the pre-psychoanalytic, pre-cognitivist, ideal-
istic conception of the conscious subject as 
primary subject.30 
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Paul Ricœur’s psychoanalytic hermeneu-
tics proves similarly problematic from the 
perspective of the naturalist. Ricœur made a 
significant attempt to conciliate between 
Freud’s metapsychology and hermeneutics by 
investigating how psychoanalysis allows for 
both the hermeneutical theme of meaning 
and intentionality and the objective and bio-
logical theme of drive causality.31 This at-
tempt, however, remains within a pre-
cognitivist conception of the unconscious. 
Ricœur defines Freud’s methodological ap-
proach as «une anti-phenomenologie, qui 
exige, non la réduction à la conscience, mais 
la réduction de la conscience».32 Psychoanal-
ysis thus becomes a demystifying hermeneu-
tics; and this project of demystification – the 
systematic search for self-deception and the 
uncovering of the underlying truth – is defi-
nitely at the core of the critical tradition to 
which Freud belongs: the “unmasking trend” 
that has been part of European thought from 
La Rochefoucauld through Enlightenment 
philosophers, Marx, Nietzsche, and Ibsen.33 
There is a problem, however. As in the case of 
the Lockean consciousness, consciousness is 
taken as given by Freud, and this makes psy-
choanalysis a dialectical variant of phenome-
nology. In contrast, a dynamic psychology 
firmly embedded in behavioural sciences is 
not vulnerable to this objection: it aims to pick 
up the critical content of psychoanalysis – its 
being a demystifying project – but within a 
framework where consciousness is at issue and 
the unconscious is understood in terms of a 
particular conception of the relationship be-
tween the subpersonal and personal levels of 
analysis in which the former is always in a dia-
lectical relationship with the latter.34 
 
█  4 Autobiographical reasoning 
 
The selfing process begins to arrange the 
Me into a self-defining narrative during early 
adolescence due, in part, to transformations in 
body (sexuality) and mind (formal operational 
thinking). There is also an increasing demand 
by others to acquire an individual socio-
cultural identity and prepare for an adult role 
in society. The upshot is that there is a loss of 
sense of self – what is generally called, follow-
ing Erikson,35 an “identity crisis” – and a need 
arises to play a more active role in self-
definition and self-creation. Constructing and 
internalizing a life story provides an answer to 
Erikson’s key identity questions – questions 
regarding who one is, how one came to be and 
where one is going in life. 
Earliest drafts of narrative identity may 
take the form of “the personal fable”, a con-
struct proposed to conceptualize a manifesta-
tion of the Piagetian adolescent egocentrism, 
i.e., the adolescent’s belief that s/he is special 
and unique, omnipotent, invulnerable, which 
gives rise to a propensity for behavioral risk-
taking.36 Later drafts of narrative identity be-
come more realistic and tempered, as reality 
testing improves and narrative skills become 
further refined.  
In an effort to wed the Piagetian cogni-
tive-developmental tradition to the narrative 
tradition, Susan Bluck and Tilmann Haber-
mas have described the social-cognitive 
changes that must take place in order for the 
adolescent to initiate the crafting of the life 
story that is at the heart of McAdams’s theo-
ry. By the end of their teenage years, individ-
uals regularly engage in sophisticated forms 
of autobiographical reasoning.37 This is a con-
structive and interpretative activity that re-
lies on the life story format for drawing con-
nections between remembered events and 
enduring and current characteristics of the 
self. This activity is termed “reasoning” to 
underscore three aspects: the constructive 
and interpretative nature of the activity, its 
both cognitive and communicative nature, 
and the normative aspect implied by its ap-
peal to reason and logic. 
Autobiographical reasoning is based on 
four social-cognitive capabilities. These in-
clude the ability to order past events in a tem-
poral manner (temporal coherence), the abil-
ity to think about the self in abstract terms 
(i.e. as embodying certain personality traits) 
and account for changes or developments in 
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the self over time (causal-motivational coher-
ence), the ability to summarize and interpret 
themes within stories and apply these to one’s 
own life (thematic coherence), and having an 
awareness of cultural norms regarding the ma-
jor milestones and events one is expected to 
experience during the life course.38 
Habermas and colleagues have tracked 
these social-cognitive changes in life stories 
across the developmental period from child-
hood to young adulthood. Habermas and de 
Silveira showed that a life narrative begins to 
emerge in middle childhood, but the coher-
ence of this narrative (in all its dimensions) 
increases during adolescence.39 This study 
was longitudinally extended to investigate 
the development of global coherence in life 
narratives from childhood to adulthood.40 It 
was found that measures of temporal and 
causal-motivational coherence increase sub-
stantially from adolescence up to early adult-
hood, as does thematic coherence, which 
continues to develop throughout middle 
adulthood. 
For our purposes, what is particularly im-
portant is that autobiographical reasoning is 
a defense mechanism, a mechanism to com-
pensate for threats of self-discontinuity.41 It 
embeds personal memories in a culturally, 
temporally, causally and thematically coher-
ent life story; thus, in situations of biograph-
ical disruption (e.g., a sudden loss of intimate 
others as in bereavement, or of major roles as 
in job loss or imprisonment), autobiograph-
ical reasoning can re-establish the diachronic 
continuity of the self through the use of ar-
guments that bridge change by embedding it 
in a larger life story context.42 
Another mechanism that can create self-
continuity consists in assimilating memories 
to the present self-concept43. The remem-
bered self is systematically distorted by au-
tomatically assimilating it to the present self-
concept, increasing the similarity between 
the present and remembered reflected self, in 
order to maintain conceptual self-sameness. 
Now, in circumstances of relative stability, 
assimilating memories to a current self-
concept may be sufficient to establish per-
sonal sameness in time or personal stability. 
However, insofar as such a mechanism bridg-
es personal change «simply by reducing the 
perception of change», it cannot «create self-
continuity when change is acknowledged»44. 
In situations of biographical upheaval, disrup-
tive effects on the sense of self-continuity can 
be compensated by the use of autobiograph-
ical arguments in life narratives. 
 
█  5 Ontological insecurity 
 
The construct of autobiographical reason-
ing brings us to the matter of the defensive 
nature of identity self-construction.  
The construction of affectional life, over 
the course of infancy and, subsequently, 
throughout one’s entire life, is closely linked to 
the construction of a subjective identity that is 
well-defined and accepted as valid. The de-
scription of the self that the young child pur-
sues is an “accepting description”, i.e., a de-
scription that is indissolubly cognitive (as a 
definition of self) and emotional-affectional 
(as an acceptance of self). Children need a clear 
and consistent capacity to describe themselves 
in a manner that is fully legitimized by care-
givers, socially valid, capable of attracting at-
tention and serving as a base for ceaselessly 
renewed affectional transactions. 
Even adolescent crisis, and together with 
it the process of social autonomization in 
post-adolescence, are largely a problem of 
identity. According to Erikson, the funda-
mental problem of adolescence lies in discov-
ering how to move from a heteronomous 
identity to an autonomous self-definition; 
and this requires an identity synthesis, i.e., a 
reworking of childhood identifications into a 
larger, self-determined set of self-identified 
ideals. In Jamesian terms, the various parts of 
the material, social and spiritual selves must 
be organised into «a new pattern that con-
fers upon the Me a unifying and purposeful 
sense of identity».45 The optimal outcome of 
such a process is a kind of dialectic balance in 
which the ego syntonic pole of identity syn-
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thesis is predominant over the ego dystonic 
pole of “identity diffusion”. The latter is con-
ceived by Erikson as an insufficient integra-
tion of self-images originating from a “weak-
ness of the ego”.46  
This claim leads us into the clinical dimen-
sion of the inextricable link between identity 
self-description and self-consciousness. One 
cannot ascribe concreteness and solidity to 
one’s own self-consciousness if it does not 
possess at its center, and as its essence, a de-
scription of identity that must be clear and, 
inextricably, “good”, in the sense of being wor-
thy of love.47 If the self-description becomes 
uncertain, the subject soon loses the feeling of 
being present. Thus, also in this case, as in De 
Martino’s theory of presence, the identity self-
construction is not a Kantian unifying process. 
Unlike Kant’s originally unitary subject, the 
psychodynamic subject is primarily non-
unitary and incessantly works to gain its unity 
(or illusion of unity) in the act of mobilizing 
resources against the threat of disgregation. 
As De Martino puts it, the unity of appercep-
tion is not a given, but a task, «the human 
task of being-there».48  
The idea that the selfing process imposes 
a teleology of self-defense on the human psy-
chobiological system finds illustration in the 
theories of object relations and attachment, 
whose theoretical focus is on problems aris-
ing from a weakness, fragility, scarce cohe-
sion or insufficient integration of those struc-
tures of the mind that Freud calls “das Ich” 
(essentially, the system of defenses). This 
structural condition of fragility is experi-
enced by the subject as a chronic feeling of 
insecurity, or lack of self-esteem, lack of con-
fidence in oneself. 
Drawing on Ronald Laing’s The divided 
self, we can describe the experiences originat-
ing from a fragility of the ego as symptoms of 
“ontological insecurity”.49 The individual with 
a firm core of ontological security, Laing af-
firms, is one who owns a sense of the self as a 
cohesive and well-demarcated entity, as well 
as a consistent feeling of biographical continu-
ity. By contrast, the ontologically insecure in-
dividual is one who is liable to the collapse of 
subjectivity described as an experience of dis-
integration, psychic deadness or numbness, 
and a sense of moral emptiness. Discontinuity 
in temporal experience is a basic feature of 
such a condition. Everyday defensive mecha-
nisms are perceived as an indispensable bul-
wark against both an outer world and an inner 
world which are experienced as threatening. 
In the context of attachment theory, 
Laing’s symptoms of ontological insecurity are 
seen as the last traces of a remote “basic 
fault”,50 which is to be traced back mainly to 
early deficiencies in the infant-caregiver rela-
tionship. In this context, the idea of an ego 
that is fragile, or the idea of a self that lacks 
“cohesion”, identifies a condition that predis-
poses individuals to a broad and varied pa-
thology including psychoses and personality 
disorders. Let us consider narcissistic person-
ality disorder.  
A share of narcissistic defenses is normal 
in the construction of one’s identity; pathol-
ogy comes into play when narcissistic defens-
es are the patient’s attempts, often sorrowful 
and at times desperate, to care for and de-
fend one’s image as protection for an identity 
felt as excessively fragile. The theme was ex-
plored in depth by the psychoanalyst Heinz 
Kohut, who presented afresh Freud’s meta-
phor of the solidity of the ego in terms of co-
hesion and self-legitimation of identity.  
A narcissistic defense consists not only in 
the more or less anxious safeguarding of the 
image that we want to have of ourselves, but 
also in a certain kind of relationship with the 
external world; in this case we are dealing 
with an object relation of a narcissistic type, 
namely, a link with situations, things or per-
sons that serve as symbols to help reassure 
ourselves about our identity. Now, in narcis-
sistic personality disorders, the feeling of 
identity is so precarious (the self is so scarcely 
cohesive, Kohut would say) that the patient 
finds it difficult to feel existent and is afraid 
of completely losing contact with himself or 
herself if deprived of such reassurances. The-
se include what Kohut calls “self-objects”, 
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namely, objects of a narcissistic type that are 
experienced as neither internal nor external 
with respect to the bounds of the identity of 
the person. The psychoanalyst writes about a 
patient (Mr. W.): 
 
It was at such times, when his unsupport-
ed childhood self began to feel frighten-
ingly strange to him and began to crum-
ble, that he had in fact surrounded him-
self with his possessions – sitting on the 
floor, looking at them, checking that they 
were there: his toys and his clothes. And 
he had at that time a particular drawer 
that contained his things, a drawer he 
thought about sometimes at night when 
he could not fall asleep, in order to reas-
sure himself.51 
 
In a category of clinical cases less serious 
than full-blown narcissistic personality, the 
individual who suffers from an insufficient 
sense of identity, while not being forced to 
adopt a defensive style that can give rise to 
pathological problems, can lead a normal life 
only by placing himself within a situation of 
dependence, and hence by eschewing posi-
tions of affiliation and responsibility. This is 
an indication that narcissistic problems, in at-
tenuated forms, are ubiquitous, and thus ra-
ther than narcissistic personalities, we should 
address the more or less effective ways in 
which each of us comes to deal with the diffi-
cult problem of our narcissistic equilibria. 
 
█  6 The interweaving of individual and col-
lective defense structures 
 
The idea of the human subject underlying 
the psychodynamic inquiry confirms De 
Martino’s reflections on the theme of pres-
ence and its crisis. A person knows that she 
exists insofar as she knows that she exists in a 
certain way, as a describable identity, con-
stant over changes. But self-consciousness as 
finding oneself again as a known identity, as 
a feeling of biographical continuity, is a pre-
carious acquisition, continuously constructed 
by the person and continuously threatened 
by critical events such as grief and affective 
loss, crises in the life cycle, economic and so-
cial crisis, natural disasters, alienation and 
loss of subjectivity, i.e., of one’s ability to act 
on the world rather than simply to be a pas-
sive object of action.  
These moments of crisis are adumbrated 
by a “total reaction” that is anguish – it «un-
derlines the risk of losing the distinction be-
tween subject and object, between thought 
and action, representation and judgment, vi-
tality and morality – it is the scream of some-
one tottering on the edge of the abyss”.52 
Sometimes a fragment of that anguish can 
lurk in the folds of everyday life, for example 
in the bewilderment that each of us may feel 
on waking. De Martino refers to the opening 
passage of Proust’s Recherche, where the au-
thor tells us how he happened to wake at mid-
night not knowing where he was, not even 
who he was, lost in an existential abyss in 
which he felt «more bereft than a cave-
dweller». But soon the crisis calms down: 
 
[…] the memory – not yet of the place 
where I was, but of several of those where 
I had lived and where I might have been –  
would come to me like help from on high 
to pull me out of the void (néant) from 
which I could not have got out on my 
own; I passed over centuries of civiliza-
tion in one second, and the image confus-
edly glimpsed of oil-lamps, then of wing-
collar shirts, gradually recomposed my 
self’s original features (les traits originaux 
de mon moi).53  
 
The path that Proust elegantly describes – 
from the total disorientation to the recovery 
of himself and of the world – illustrates the 
reverse of the delusional experience of change 
that announces the psychotic event, for, in this 
case, the backdrop of domesticity gets de-
structured against any effort of recovery: 
 
Thus, a painful inversion of sign is in the 
process of gaining the most obvious and 
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familiar perceptive areas, which now ap-
pear to be strange, bizarre, artificial, the-
atrical, unreal, mechanical, out of joint, 
absurd: and that inversion of sign, that 
eccentric motion involving the backdrop 
of the operable and destabilizing any sup-
port to continue to be a real operative 
center, reflect the fall of the presentificat-
ing energy on all the fronts of the possible 
valorization.54  
 
In the psychopathological crisis, anguish 
expresses the resistance that presence opposes 
to its disruption. In experiencing the extreme 
risk of the disintegration of the person’s uni-
tary being, disordered people try to exert con-
trol over such a risk by suspending becoming 
within themselves; i.e., they strive to carry out 
«a total escape from the historicity of exist-
ence».55 Such dehistoricization can be no-
ticed, for example, in the catatonic stupor:56  
 
A schizophrenic […] was realizing, with 
growing anguish, that insurmountable 
difficulties thwarted his action: any 
movement that he was about to make 
seemed to present the perilous possibility 
of committing a harmful or ineffective 
act; and thus this mental patient, domi-
nated by anguish, chose not to eat, dress, 
or wash, finally reducing himself to the 
absolute immobility of catatonic stupor.57 
 
And yet this search for total absence is an 
unproductive strategy, an inadequate defense 
mechanism, to the extent that it is not able to 
carry out the redemption of presence, i.e., to 
reintegrate it into the historical reality. Thus, 
the psychopathological condition turns out 
to be a merely private “individual drama” of 
escape from history, which is unable to 
«reestablish the spiritual dialectic».58 The 
disordered person then fails to «retake pos-
session of the alienated psychic realities, put-
ting them once again into the cultural circuit, 
redisclosing to them their values».59 
In contrast with the psychopathological 
(“irrelative”) dehistorification is the dehis-
torification that is put to use under cultural 
control. In order to resolve the critical mo-
ments of becoming only culture can offer 
«an organic system of vital techniques of de-
fense», which are all particular forms of the 
fundamental technique of “institutional” de-
historification, i.e., the suspension of becom-
ing in the pure iteration of myth and ritual: 
 
Magical protection [...] is carried out 
thanks to the institution of a metahistori-
cal level that absolves two distinct protec-
tive functions. Above all, this level creates 
a stable and traditionalized representative 
horizon in which the risky variety of pos-
sible individual crises finds a moment of 
coming to a halt, configuration, unifica-
tion, and cultural reintegration. At the 
same time, the metahistorical functions as 
a place of the “de-historification” of be-
coming: a place in which, through the 
repetition of identical operative models, 
the historical proliferation of happening 
can from one time to the next be reab-
sorbed, and thus amputated of its actual 
and possible negativity.60  
 
Thus the risk of the loss of the self enters 
into a dynamic of recovery and reintegration. 
The crisis of grief is a case in point. Like anx-
iety, shame, and guilt, grief can be character-
ized as a “foundational emotion”, i.e., an 
emotion that is constitutive of human self-
hood and subjectivity.61 And De Martino 
views the crisis of grief as the paradigmatic 
exemplification of one the two main parame-
ters of feeling in crisis, the temporal one.62 In 
the loss of a beloved person there is a tem-
poral fracture, i.e., a traumatic breakdown of 
the expected continuity. Due to this disrup-
tion of biographical continuity, the bereaved 
have the sensation of losing themselves, 
which – as in the case of the person who en-
ters the state of olon (or latah etc.) or Laing’s 
schizophrenic – foreshadows an ego dissolu-
tion experience. In this perspective, funeral 
rituals serve to bring the mourners back into 
their particular history by assimilating the 
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crisis of grief to a metahistorical pattern:  
 
The chaotic planctus of the crisis is trans-
formed into a ritual planctus in which al-
ienated psychic realities (melancholic in-
action, self-harming impulses, and the 
like) are rediscovered, retrieved, and con-
centrated in the hypnoid state of the ritu-
al presence of lament. In such a state, the-
se psychic realities are disciplined accord-
ing to an anonymous and dreamy “meas-
ure”; in the “this-is-how-one-mourns” ste-
reotype of tradition.63  
 
Thus, when individuals face a mournful 
event, culturally controlled dehistorification 
offers them a route along which the risk of 
the disintegration of the person’s unitary be-
ing is experienced, but at the same time over-
come, i.e., in which there is the crisis (the 
mourner’s experience of the disruption of the 
sense of self-continuity) but also redemption 
from the crisis (the ritual mourning that sup-
ports the re-establishment of the sense of 
self-continuity). This is a path that can be 
characterized as a process of mythico-ritual re-
integration: «a descent (catabasi) toward psy-
chic realities at risk of alienation», but with the 
knowledge that there will be «the ascent 
(anabasi) toward values».64 An itinerary 
stretching into a world that is no longer the his-
torical world (the world of everyday uncertain-
ties and of great crises of existence) but rather 
the timeless world of myth (a body of scriptural 
and oral narratives and symbols) and its ritual 
repetition. A world in which there is death but 
also life after death, and in which one pursues 
the narrative of death and life after death be-
cause this narrative allows one to tell oneself 
that death can always be overcome.  
The institutional dehistorification is thus 
a reintegrative technique that generates self-
protective structures by means of a repertoire 
of actions (rite) that embed critical events 
into a broader, metahistorical cultural order 
encoded in myths. This cultural intervention 
can support individual self-protective mech-
anisms such as the afore-mentioned autobio-
graphical reasoning.  
Consider the case of the persistent com-
plex bereavement disorder, defined as a dis-
order characterized by «severe and persis-
tent grief and mourning reactions».65 Due to 
the disruption of biographical continuity, in-
dividuals suffering from this disorder experi-
ence an emotional numbing since the time of 
the loss, detachment, a diminished sense of 
identity in which they feel a part of them-
selves has been lost, a fading of the coherence 
of their life stories that is in danger of leading 
to a fragmentary and inarticulate self narra-
tive. In these moments, autobiographical rea-
soning can subserve an active process of 
meaning reconstruction in the wake of loss. 
But here’s the thing: a thorough understand-
ing of the grieving process requires taking 
account of both the individual and the social 
levels of analysis of self-protective mecha-
nisms. The bereaved cannot get by alone, 
mourning cannot be done without an itiner-
ary that is already culturally structured and 
pursued in interaction with the broader 
community concerned with the loss.66 
 
█  7 Conclusions 
 
In this article we explored the defensive 
nature of personal identity in its individual 
and collective aspects under the guidance of 
Ernesto De Martino.  
We drew on the psychological sciences to 
put forward a conception of the constitution 
of ourselves as persons in terms of the estab-
lishment of a process of self-description that 
is a unifying, integrative, synthesizing “self-
ing” process. This is a (non-Kantian) psy-
chobiological synthetic function that origi-
nates the subject’s narrative identity, which is 
the key ingredient in a developmental ac-
count of the identity of the person as a conti-
nuity across time and space, interpreted re-
flectively by the agent.  
Our focus was on Dan McAdams’ neo-
Jamesian theory of narrative identity and 
Tillman Habermas’ construct of autobio-
graphical reasoning. The intrinsically defen-
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sive nature of these two constructs confirms 
and boosts De Martino’s theorizing on the 
crisis of presence. Self-consciousness as find-
ing oneself again as a known identity, as a 
feeling of biographical continuity, is a precar-
ious acquisition, continuously constructed by 
the person and constantly exposed to the risk 
of disgregation. As Giddens puts it, personal 
identity is «something that has to be routine-
ly created and sustained in the reflexive ac-
tivities of the individual».67 This precarious-
ness is the key to understanding the defen-
siveness immanent to the selfing process. 
The need to construct and protect a subjec-
tive identity that is valid to the greatest ex-
tent possible is rooted in the primary need to 
subsist subjectively, and thus to exist solidly 
as a describable ego, as a unitary subject.  
Thus, the identity of person constitutes 
itself as a repertoire of composite psychologi-
cal maneuvers, of activities that take pains to 
cope with its lack of ontological guarantee, 
constructing itself on the edge of its original 
“non-being”, as it were. The construction and 
defense of identity, however, is not only a 
psychological theme, but it is also an anthro-
pological one since defense mechanisms fall 
along a spectrum that stretches from the in-
dividual to the collective level. At a social and 
collective level, defenses consist in the con-
struction of De Martino’s system of tech-
niques designed to protect the unity of self-
consciousness, namely «a system of refer-
ences – in part symbolic and ritual – which 
give perspective to living, domesticity and 
meaning to one’s own being-in-the-world».68 
Unlike what De Martino thought, however, 
the individual mind, as portrayed by psycho-
dynamic research, is no longer the place of an 
unproductive “irrelative dehistoricization”; 
rather, it is the cunning sphere of «the intra-
psychic defenses and the interpersonal ma-
noeuvres to which each of us appeals, in rela-
tionship with other people and our own envi-
ronment, to defend our self-describability 
and, indissolubly, the solidity of our own self-
conscious being».69  
The case of the persistent complex be-
reavement disorder was taken as a model of 
the interplay between individual and collec-
tive defensive structures. 
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